Institutional Forecasting: The Performance of Thin Virtual Stock Markets

We study the performance of Virtual Stock Markets (VSMs) in an institutional forecasting environment. We compare VSMs to the Combined Judgmental Forecast (CJF) and the Key Informant (KI) approach. We find that VSMs can be effectively applied in an environment with a small number of knowledgeable informants, i.e., in thin markets. Our results show that none of the three approaches differ in forecasting accuracy in a low knowledge-heterogeneity environment. However, where there is high knowledge-heterogeneity, the VSM approach outperforms the CJF approach, which in turn outperforms the KI approach. Hence, our results provide useful insight into when each of the three approaches might be most effectively applied.Forecasting;Electronic Markets;Information Markets;Virtual Stock Markets

Design of a low cost earth resources system

The author has identified the following significant results. Survey results indicated that users of remote sensing data in the Southeastern U.S. were increasingly turning to digital processing techniques. All the states surveyed have had some involvement in projects using digitally processed data. Even those states which do not yet have in-house capabilities for digital processing were extremely interested in and were planning to develop such capabilities

Oil Supply and Tax Incentive

macroeconomics, oil, tax incentive

Computer processing of peach tree decline data

There are no author-identified significant results in this report

Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing?

We analyze 'Pay What You Want' as a business model for Open Access publishing by discussing motives leading authors to make voluntary contributions, potential benefits for publishers and present results from a field experiment at one publisher. Data from the field experiment indicate authors' willingness to voluntarily contribute

Technology transfer from NASA to targeted industries, volume 2

This volume contains the following materials to support Volume 1: (1) Survey of Metal Fabrication Industry in Alabama; (2) Survey of Electronics Manufacturing/Assembly Industry in Alabama; (3) Apparel Modular Manufacturing Simulators; (4) Synopsis of a Stereolithography Project; (5) Transferring Modular Manufacturing Technology to an Apparel Firm; (6) Letters of Support; (7) Fact Sheets; (8) Publications; and (9) One Stop Access to NASA Technology Brochure

Complex Role of Secondary Electron Emissions in Dust Grain Charging in Space Environments: Measurements on Apollo 11 and 17 Dust Grains

Dust grains in various astrophysical environments are generally charged electrostatically by photoelectric emissions with radiation from nearby sources, or by electron/ion collisions by sticking or secondary electron emissions. Knowledge of the dust grain charges and equilibrium potentials is important for understanding of a variety of physical and dynamical processes in the interstellar medium (ISM), and heliospheric, interplanetary, planetary, and lunar environments. The high vacuum environment on the lunar surface leads to some unusual physical and dynamical phenomena involving dust grains with high adhesive characteristics, and levitation and transportation over long distances. It has been well recognized that the charging properties of individual micron/submicron size dust grains are expected to be substantially different from the corresponding values for bulk materials and theoretical models. In this paper we present experimental results on charging of individual dust grains selected from Apollo 11 and Apollo 17 dust samples by exposing them to mono-energetic electron beams in the 10- 400 eV energy range. The charging rates of positively and negatively charged particles of approximately 0.2 to 13 microns diameters are discussed in terms of the secondary electron emission (SEE) process, which is found to be a complex charging process at electron energies as low as 10-25 eV, with strong particle size dependence. The measurements indicate substantial differences between dust charging properties of individual small size dust grains and of bulk materials

Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?

Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed costs to price discriminate without setting a reference price. Their participatory and innovative nature gives rise to promotional benefits that do not accrue to posted-price sellers. We explore the nature and effects of these benefits and compare PWYW and NYOP using controlled lab experiments. We show that PWYW is a very aggressive strategy that achieves almost full market penetration. It can be profitable if there are promotional benefits and if marginal costs are low. In contrast, NYOP can be used profitably also if marginal costs are high and if there are no such benefits. It reduces price competition and segments the market. In a second experiment, we generate promotional benefits endogenously. We show that PWYW monopolizes the follow-up market but fails to be profitable. NYOP is less successful in penetrating the market but yields much higher profits

Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?

Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer-driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed capacity costs in order to appeal to additional customers by reducing prices without setting a reference price. In this experimental study we compare the functioning and the performance of these two pricing mechanisms. We show that both mechanisms can be successfully used to endogenously price discriminate. PWYW can be very successful if there is an additional promotional benefit to using PWYW and if marginal costs are not too high. PWYW is a very aggressive competitive strategy that achieves almost full market penetration. NYOP is a less aggressive strategy that can also be used if marginal costs are high. It reduces price competition and segments the market. Low valuation customers are more likely to use NYOP while high valuation customers prefer a posted price seller